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Home on the Gun Range: Discussing Whether 
Kansas’s New Stand Your Ground Statute Will 
Protect Gun Owners Who Use Disproportionate 
Force in Self-Defense∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 8, 2006, Norman Borden was walking his four pit bulls 
in West Palm Beach, Florida, when he got into an altercation with two 
young men.1  The men exchanged heated words, and Borden showed the 
men that he had a gun.  The two young men left and went to pick up a 
third man, who was a “documented member of a violent gang.”2  The 
three men returned in a Jeep, carrying bats, and started to drive toward 
Borden.3  In response, he shot at the vehicle fourteen times.4  After 
shooting five times through the windshield, Borden walked around to the 
driver’s side and shot into the car nine more times.5  Two of the three 
men in the car were killed, and the other man was critically wounded.6  
During Borden’s murder trial, the prosecution argued that the first five 
shots were in self-defense, but the last nine shots were murder.7  
However, under Florida’s new “stand your ground” law,8 all of Borden’s 
actions were considered self-defense, and he was acquitted.9  Florida’s 
law allows the use of deadly force in self-defense when reasonably  
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 1. Nancy L. Othn, Free but in Fear of Reprisal—Man Acquitted of Murder, but Living Under 
Threat, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 1, 2007, at 1A. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Larry Keller, Jury Acquits Shooter in Castle Doctrine Case—Borden Said He Killed Two 
Attackers in Self-Defense, PALM BEACH POST, June 26, 2007, at 1A. 
 8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2005) (effective Oct. 1, 2005). 
 9. Othn, supra note 1. 
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necessary and does not require that a person retreat before using deadly 
force.10 
In May, 2006, Kansas passed a new “stand your ground” law.11  
Kansas’s stand your ground law is similar to Florida’s in several ways, 
but it does not include a reasonableness requirement, and it does not 
expressly provide for—or limit—the use of deadly force.  If the events of 
the Borden case had occurred in Kansas, it is possible that Borden may 
not even have been tried for his actions.  Because there is no 
reasonableness requirement in Kansas’s new statute, there would not 
have been any inquiry into the reasonableness of the last nine shots.  
Rather, Borden may have been protected by the new stand your ground 
law, which allows a person to “meet force with force” when “attacked” 
in any place where he “has a right to be.”12  In addition to this new 
statute, Kansas also has separate defense of person13 and defense of 
dwelling14 statutes, each of which was amended in 2006 to include the 
right to use deadly force and to abrogate any duty to retreat.  Kansas’s 
new stand your ground law is unclear and ambiguous.  The law does not 
define critical terms and provides no standard for courts to follow when 
applying the statute.  The law includes no requirement of reasonableness 
or proportionality, and does not indicate the amount of force allowed.  
The other defense statutes may be applied when deadly force is used, but 
nothing in the stand your ground law precludes courts from applying that 
law when deadly force is used, even disproportionately.  Unfortunately, 
it is unclear what the exact outcome would have been for Borden in 
Kansas because Kansas’s new stand your ground law, though enacted 
almost two years ago, has not been interpreted by any Kansas court. 
The stand your ground law was passed during the same legislative 
session as Kansas’s new concealed carry statutes (collectively 
“concealed carry”).15  Concealed carry is likely to exacerbate the 
problems associated with the stand your ground law.  Because people are 
now lawfully allowed to have guns concealed on their persons, it is 
possible that the stand your ground law will produce unwanted results 
involving gun-related violence.  If a fight does result in gun violence, and 
neither party has a duty to retreat, the stand your ground law may protect  
 
                                                     
 10. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2005). 
 11. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3218 (2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. § 21-3211. 
 14. Id. § 21-3212. 
 15. Id. §§ 75-7c01 through 7c12. 
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the party who kills his challenger—even if the killer acted unreasonably, 
and even if he could have retreated safely. 
This Note will address problems likely to arise as a result of 
Kansas’s stand your ground law and the new right to carry concealed 
firearms, and how those problems may be remedied or avoided through 
legislative or judicial action.  First, I will provide background on the 
history of self-defense and retreat in the United States and Kansas, as 
well as background on the passage of the stand your ground law and 
concealed carry in Kansas.  I will also discuss the problems with the 
stand your ground statute in greater detail and compare Kansas’s stand 
your ground law to those in other states.  This comparison will illustrate 
various ways the Kansas Legislature could improve the statutory 
language.  Finally, I will argue that the stand your ground law should be 
amended to include definitions for the terms “attack” and “meet force 
with force,” and that some standard of proportionality or reasonableness 
should be included.  If the legislature declines to amend the statute, 
Kansas courts should define the terms of the statute narrowly, possibly 
inferring a reasonableness or proportionality standard within the statute. 
Although it is important to protect a person who must act with force 
to defend himself or others, it is imperative that any protection granted 
by the legislature or the courts be unmistakably clear.  Kansas’s new 
stand your ground law does not meet this essential requirement, and this 
lack of clarity is likely to create serious problems without legislative or 
judicial intervention. 
II.   BACKGROUND 
A. Self-Defense Generally 
There are four common elements, or limitations, to the use of force 
in self-defense.16  These common elements provide that “1) ‘[f]orce may 
be used only against an unlawful aggressor;’ 2) ‘[t]he use of force must 
be strictly necessary;’ 3) ‘[t]he amount of force must be proportional to 
the force being threatened;’ and 4) ‘[t]he attack must be imminent.’”17  
Another important element of self-defense is that the action taken must 
                                                     
 16. Michelle Jaffe, Comment, Up in Arms Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30 
NOVA L. REV. 155, 158 (2005). 
 17. Id. at 158 (brackets in original) (quoting Whitley Kaufman, Is There a “Right” to Self-
Defense?, 23 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 20, 20–21 (2004)).  See also Renee Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide 
Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in Self-Defense, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 331, 332 (2006) 
(“[T]he prevention of harm cannot be achieved by causing harm that is disproportionate.”). 
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be reasonable.18  Reasonableness is hard to define,19 and different 
jurisdictions apply different standards.  In New York’s famous case, 
People v. Goetz,20 the New York Court of Appeals applied both objective 
and subjective tests in determining reasonableness.21  The court held that 
the jury must make two determinations: first, “whether the defendant . . . 
believed deadly force was necessary” and second, “whether these beliefs 
were reasonable” in an objective sense.22  In other jurisdictions, courts 
have used a purely subjective standard.  For example, in People v. 
O’Neal,23 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that “a defendant’s 
reasonable belief as to the use of force, determined subjectively, justified 
the use of such force.”24  Although different courts have applied different 
versions of reasonableness, the standard is nonetheless present in every 
jurisdiction’s self-defense laws. 
Kansas courts’ interpretation of self-defense standards followed 
many of the same guidelines as those described above.  In State v. 
Howard,25 the Kansas Supreme Court held that the defense of self-
defense requires that there “be a reasonable apprehension of imminent 
danger, and of the reasonableness of this apprehension the jury are to be 
the judges.  A party assailed is justified in acting upon the facts as they 
appear to him, and is not judged by the facts as they are.”26  The court 
elaborated on this standard in State v. Davis,27 deciding that the test for 
reasonableness “is not what the circumstances actually were but whether 
the circumstances were such as appeared to the defendant at the time to 
be reasonably necessary to protect himself.”28  The Kansas Supreme 
Court’s focus on the both the defendant’s perspective and his reasonable 
apprehension of danger suggests the court regards the test for self-
defense as having both subjective and objective elements. 
In 1969, the legislature passed three defense statutes—defense of 
persons, defense of dwellings, and defense of property29—which were 
                                                     
 18. Jaffe, supra note 16, at 159. 
 19. Id. at 159–60. 
 20. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
 21. Id. at 52. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 472 N.E.2d 441 (Ill. 1984). 
 24. John F. Wagner, Jr., Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of Criminal 
Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force Is Necessary—Modern 
Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993, 1006 (1989) (citing People v. O’Neal, 472 N.E.2d 441 (1984)). 
 25. 14 Kan. 173 (1875). 
 26. Id. at 174–75. 
 27. 218 P.2d 215 (Kan. 1950). 
 28. Id. at 217 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 29. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3211 through 3213 (1969). 
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the original versions of the current defense statutes in Kansas.  The 
defense of persons statute provided that “[a] person is justified in the use 
of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and 
he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself 
or another against such aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.”30  
In State v. Saleem,31 the Kansas Supreme Court quoted a jury instruction 
given in the trial court, which stated that the “justification [for self-
defense] requires both a belief on the part of the defendant and the 
existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that 
belief.”32  In enacting this statute, the Kansas Legislature codified the 
common law standard requiring both a subjective and an objective 
apprehension of imminent danger.  The defense of dwelling statute used 
nearly identical language in reference to the protection of one’s 
dwelling.33  Both the original defense of persons and defense of dwelling 
statutes contained reasonableness standards; however, neither 
specifically allowed for the use of deadly force, and neither mentioned an 
affirmative or negative duty to retreat.34  While these statutes were in 
effect, Kansas courts ruled that there was no duty to retreat before using 
force against an attacker, even when deadly force was used.  In State v. 
Scobee,35 the Kansas Supreme Court held that, although the self-defense 
statute did not mention whether there was a duty to retreat, Kansas 
common law did not require that a person against whom force is 
threatened must retreat.36 
B. The Retreat Rule 
1. English and Early American Views 
English common law required retreat in self-defense cases, if 
practicable, before the use of deadly force.37  This rule’s purpose was to 
promote civility within society and “retain control of quarrels between 
individuals.”38  However, this rule was discarded early in the United 
                                                     
 30. Id. § 21-3211. 
 31. 977 P.2d 921 (Kan. 1999). 
 32. Id. at 930. 
 33. § 21-3212. 
 34. §§ 21-3211 through 3212. 
 35. 748 P.2d 862 (Kan. 1988). 
 36. Id. at 867.  See also infra Part II.B.2. 
 37. Jaffe, supra note 16, at 160. 
 38. Id. 
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States.39  One explanation for this change is that a “duty to retreat . . . fit 
poorly into a political ideology that saw individuals as possessing natural 
rights, including the right to violent recourse . . . .”40  American courts 
instead promoted the idea that “a true man, who is without fault, is not 
obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, 
maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm.”41  
This rule is applied almost uniformly in each state, at least to the extent 
that no state requires retreat from one’s home.42  The “rationale [for the 
exception to the English common law rule] is that there is not (or at least 
should not be) a place safer than home.”43  This exception is commonly 
referred to as the “castle doctrine.”44 
Now many states—including Alabama, Texas, Florida, and 
Kansas—have adopted a no duty to retreat rule in some form by statute.45  
Each of these statutes, with the exception of Kansas’s, includes a 
reasonableness requirement.46  These reasonableness requirements 
appear in one of three forms: (1) a separate provision with its own 
reasonableness standard; (2) a no-duty-to-retreat provision included in 
the general self-defense statute; or (3) a separate provision that is subject 
to the reasonableness standard of a different section.  Florida’s self-
defense statute, which passed in 2005, includes a presumption of 
reasonableness.  A person’s use of deadly force in his home is presumed 
to be reasonable under specifically enumerated circumstances.47  Florida 
also enacted a stand your ground law, which allows the use of force, 
including deadly force, when reasonably used to defend against an 
attacker.48  In 2007, Texas amended its self-defense law to include a 
presumption of reasonableness when force—including deadly force—is 
used in the defense of persons or dwellings.49  Texas’s statute also 
                                                     
 39. See Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward 
Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 
311 (1992) (citing a Georgia Supreme Court case from 1855 as one of the early manifestations of 
this change). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876). 
 42. Jaffe, supra note 16, at 168. 
 43. Steven P. Aggergaard, Note, Criminal Law—Retreat from Reason: How Minnesota’s New 
No-Retreat Rule Confuses the Law and Cries for Alteration—State v. Glowacki, 29 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 657, 665 (2002). 
 44. Jaffe, supra note 16, at 168. 
 45. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-3218 (2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 2007). 
 46. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31. 
 47. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(1). 
 48. Id. § 776.013(3). 
 49. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31–9.32. 
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includes a list of offenses that create a presumption of reasonableness for 
any retaliating victim.50  Alabama’s statute, amended in 2006, is an 
example of a no duty to retreat provision that incorporates a 
reasonableness standard from the general self-defense statute.51 
2. The Retreat Rule in Kansas Case Law 
Kansas, like many other states, determined that a person should not 
be required to retreat before using force to protect his own life.52  The 
Kansas Supreme Court first decided this issue in State v. Reed by 
summarily asserting the principle in the court’s Syllabus.53  In State v. 
Hatch,54 the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed its earlier assertion, stating 
that “[t]he doctrine that a party unlawfully attacked must ‘retreat to the 
wall,’ before he can be justified in taking the life of his assailant in self-
defense, does not obtain in this state.”55  More recently, in State v. 
Scobee,56 the court reversed the murder conviction of a defendant who 
killed two aggressors in his driveway.  The Kansas Supreme Court relied 
on several earlier cases, including Reed and Hatch, in determining that 
the omission of an instruction on retreat was reversible error because the 
prosecution relied on an erroneous argument that the defendant had a 
duty to retreat.57  Following Scobee, the Kansas Supreme Court decided 
State v. Ricks.58  In Ricks, the court determined that the defendant was 
not entitled to a no-duty-to-retreat jury instruction because he was not at 
home when the incident occurred.59  The court distinguished that case 
from Scobee, noting that defendant Scobee was in his driveway at the 
time of the shooting, while defendant Ricks was in a public parking lot.60  
However, the court’s decision in Ricks seems to rest on the fact that 
Ricks was the first aggressor in the altercation, not on the fact that he 
would have otherwise had an affirmative duty to retreat in a place outside 
the home.61 
                                                     
 50. Id. § 32(a)(2)(b). 
 51. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23. 
 52. See State v. Reed, 37 P. 174, 175 (Kan. 1894). 
 53. Id. 
 54. 46 P. 708 (Kan. 1896). 
 55. Id. at 709. 
 56. 748 P.2d 862 (Kan. 1988). 
 57. Id. at 867–68. 
 58. 894 P.2d 191 (Kan. 1995). 
 59. Id. at 193–94. 
 60. Id. at 193. 
 61. Id. at 193–94. 
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C. Kansas’s New Self-Defense and Retreat Rules 
In 2006, the Kansas Legislature amended the defense of persons and 
defense of dwelling statutes62 to include provisions regarding the use of 
deadly force and the duty to retreat.  These amendments give a person 
the express right to use deadly force “if such person reasonably believes 
deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily 
harm.”63  The amendments also added a no-duty-to-retreat provision to 
Kansas’s defense statutes.  Both statutes now state that “[n]othing in this 
section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to 
protect such person or a third person.”64  Therefore, when using deadly 
force in defense of one’s self, a third person, a dwelling or an occupied 
vehicle, the person must act reasonably, and he does not have a duty to 
retreat before using deadly force. 
In addition to these amendments, Kansas added the new stand your 
ground law.  That law states that “[a] person who is not engaged in an 
unlawful activity and who is attacked in a place where such person has a 
right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand such person’s 
ground and meet force with force.”65  This statute does not include any 
limitations on location or any requirement of reasonableness or 
proportionality.  It also does not specify whether or not a person can use 
deadly force.  Only one Kansas court has cited this statute, but the case 
did not discuss the scope or the possible application of the statute.66 
D. Concealed Carry in Kansas 
Roughly six weeks after the Kansas Legislature passed the stand 
your ground law, it passed Kansas’s concealed carry statutes, allowing 
Kansans who qualify to obtain a permit to carry concealed firearms.67  
The law passed over Governor Sebelius’s veto.68  Most states’ concealed 
carry statutes, including Kansas’s, are “shall-issue” statutes, which 
                                                     
 62. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3211–12 (2006). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. §§ 21-3211(c), 21-3212(c). 
 65. Id. § 21-3218. 
 66. State v. Sola-Morales, 2008 WL 2510154 (June 20, 2008).  In an unpublished table 
disposition, the Kansas Court of Appeals indicated that § 21-3218 was intended to “expand the 
circumstances under which the ‘no-duty-to-retreat’ rule is applicable in Kansas,” but determined that 
the statute did not apply to the facts of the case.  Id. at *12.  The court also determined that the 
statute would apply only prospectively.  Id. 
 67. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c01 through 7c12 (2006). 
 68. Governor’s Message to the Senate, March 21, 2006. 
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include several common characteristics.69  First, these statutes limit the 
discretion of the government body responsible for issuing permits.70  In 
other words, “[i]n a shall-issue statute, the local official must issue a 
permit to anyone who meets the basic requirements of the statute.”71  
Shall-issue statutes also generally include “language requiring a 
background check for purposes of detecting anything that might make 
the applicant a high risk for carrying a concealed weapon.”72  Kansans 
who wish to obtain a concealed carry permit must satisfy an extensive 
list of qualifications, such as age, mental and physical capability, and the 
absence of a felony conviction.73  Many states, including Kansas, require 
that “applicants [] complete a gun safety course.”74  Shall-issue 
concealed carry statutes, including Kansas’s,75 commonly designate 
“locations where a concealed weapon may not be carried regardless of 
whether or not a permit has been obtained.”76  For example, concealed 
weapons are not allowed in courthouses, schools, or churches, among 
other places, even if the person carrying the weapons has a valid 
permit.77  Finally, most include a provision stating “whether the state will 
honor valid concealed-carry permits issued by other states.”78  Kansas 
will honor another state’s permit if the permit holder is not a Kansas 
resident and the attorney general determines that the standards for 
obtaining the other state’s permit are acceptable.79 
Concealed carry has been a hotly debated topic. One side of the 
debate argues that more guns in the hands of responsible individuals will 
bring down crime rates.80  This argument, made by John Lott and David 
Mustard, has been challenged and criticized.81  Jens Ludwig determined 
that the results obtained from Lott and Mustard’s data were “due in part  
 
                                                     
 69. Steven W. Kranz, Comment, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small 
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 638, 649 (2006). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 650. 
 73. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c04(a)(2), (3), (4), (8) (2007). 
 74. Kranz, supra note 69, at 650; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(b). 
 75. § 75-7c10. 
 76. Kranz, supra note 69, at 651. 
 77. § 75-7c10(a)(4), (13), (21). 
 78. Kranz, supra note 69, at 652. 
 79. § 75-7c03(c). 
 80. John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed 
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1997). 
 81. See generally Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less 
Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003). 
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or whole to unmeasured variables.”82  Another article critical of Lott and 
Mustard’s theory stated 
that the statistical evidence that these laws have reduced crime is 
limited, sporadic, and extraordinarily fragile. Minor changes of 
specifications can generate wide shifts in the estimated effects of these 
laws.  . . . While we do not want to overstate the strength of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the extremely variable results[,] . . . 
if anything, there is stronger evidence for the conclusion that these laws 
increase crime than there is for the conclusion that they decrease it.83 
As these criticisms suggest, it is difficult to get completely accurate 
data about how often guns are used in defense.84  Estimates from some 
sources are too low because of unreported instances of defensive gun 
use.85  Some data, which comes from one-time telephone surveys, tends 
to “overstate the prevalence of defensive gun use because of 
‘telescoping,’ . . . self-presentation bias, and other sources of 
measurement error.”86  The question that “remains controversial is 
whether enhanced regulation of gun ownership will increase or decrease 
crime.  The reason behind this controversy is that, while guns make 
criminal violence more lethal, guns may also have the beneficial effect of 
enabling private citizens to defend themselves against criminal attack.”87 
Regardless of the laws enacted in any state, data shows that the 
majority of homicides, either justifiable or not, are committed using 
firearms.88  The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Justice 
Information Services Division compiles homicide data each year and 
creates tables showing the distribution of homicides based on various 
factors, including the states where the offenses occurred, weapons used, 
victim information, and circumstances of the offense.89  Several of those 
tables indicate that firearms are the most commonly used weapons in 
both murder and justifiable homicide cases.90  More specifically, 195 out 
                                                     
 82. Jens Ludwig, Gun Self-Defense and Deterrence, 27 CRIME & JUST. 363, 367 (2000). 
 83. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 81, at 1201–02. 
 84. Ludwig, supra note 82, at 363. 
 85. See id. at 366 (discussing the results of the National Crime Victimization Survey). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 365. 
 88. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division, Crime in the United States, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/expanded_ 
information/homicide.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division, Expanded Homicide Data Table 6, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/ 
expanded_information/data/shrtable_06.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008); Department of Justice, 
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of the 241 justifiable homicides91 committed in 2006 were committed 
using a firearm—a handgun, rifle, or shotgun.92  Therefore, even if 
concealed carry laws do not directly change a state’s crime rates, there 
may be an adverse effect based solely on the increased presence of 
weapons in that state. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems with Kansas’s Stand Your Ground Law 
There are two major problems with Kansas’s stand your ground law.  
First, the statute’s language is flawed.  The text includes terms subject to 
multiple interpretations because they are not defined, and it includes no 
standard of reasonableness or proportionality.  Second, the passage of the 
new stand your ground law may cause unforeseen problems in 
conjunction with the concealed carry law. 
1. Problems with the Statutory Language 
The language of the stand your ground law presents two problems 
for future interpretation and application.  First, the terms of the statute 
are not defined, either in their meaning or in their scope.  Second, there is 
no standard of reasonableness or proportionality in the statute. 
In order for the statute to apply, a person must be “attacked.”93  
However, the term “attacked” is not defined.  The dictionary definition 
of “attack” is fairly extensive; it includes both physical and verbal forms 
of “attack.”94  The absence of a definition of “attack” is even more 
troublesome when viewed in conjunction with another clause of the 
statute.  The statute also provides that when “attacked,” a person can 
“meet force with force.”95  There is no indication of how much force 
would be appropriate for which type of attack.  Because there is no 
indication of how much force is acceptable, it is possible that the statute 
will protect defensive uses of force that are disproportionate to the 
                                                                                                                       
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Expanded 
Homicide Data Table 14, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/expanded_information/data/ 
shrtable_14.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008). 
 91. The FBI defines “justifiable homicide” in this context as “[t]he killing of a felon, during the 
commission of a felony, by a private citizen.”  Expanded Homicide Data Table 14, supra note 90. 
 92. Id. 
 93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3218(a) (2006). 
 94. OXFORD POCKET AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 43 (2002). 
 95. § 21-3218(a). 
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threatened force.  For example, if someone is punched in the face, can he 
respond by attacking with a gun or knife?  The answer is unclear under 
the current statutory language.  Because there is no definition of “attack” 
or “meet force with force,” or any indication of how those phrases should 
be interpreted, it is difficult to know what would be reasonable or 
proportionate in situations where the stand your ground law applies.  It is 
possible that the actions of someone like Norman Borden, who fired an 
extra nine shots into a car full of people, would be presumed reasonable. 
One central element of the defense of self-defense historically has 
been that the force used must be reasonable or proportionate to the 
aggressor’s force.96  Unlike the other state statutes mentioned above, 
Kansas’s stand your ground law does not even attempt to relate back to 
the reasonableness requirements of the other defense statutes.  Without 
an express standard of reasonableness, or any reference to those 
standards included in the other defense statutes, it is unlikely that Kansas 
courts will interpret the statute as containing a reasonableness standard.  
The restrictions inherent in the rules of statutory construction, as 
discussed below, likely prevent such an interpretation.97 
2. Problems in Conjunction with Concealed Carry 
The problems with the stand your ground law will likely be 
exacerbated by the ability of Kansas citizens to carry concealed firearms.  
Concealed carry gives Kansans the ability to carry concealed firearms in 
many public places.98  As previously discussed,99 there is a list in the 
statute that limits some of the places to which a concealed firearm can be 
carried, but concealed carry is allowed in all places not mentioned in the 
statute or prohibited by private property owners.100  Similarly, the stand 
your ground law allows a person to use force wherever he “has a right to 
be.”101  This statute creates a problem because Kansans, in many public 
places, are allowed both to have concealed weapons and stand their 
ground in a fight.  Without a duty to retreat from a violent confrontation, 
a greater number of people likely will use concealed firearms to protect 
themselves in public altercations.  As mentioned above, the research on 
this possibility is inconclusive on both sides of the argument because of 
                                                     
 96. Lerner, supra note 17, at 332. 
 97. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 98. § 75-7c03. 
 99. See supra Part II.D. 
 100. § 75-7c10–11. 
 101. § 21-3218. 
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the difficulty of gathering concrete evidence of defensive gun use, and 
because of other factors that may contribute to an increase or decrease in 
violent, gun-related crime.102  Therefore, it is difficult to know whether 
stand your ground laws generally have had this effect in concealed carry 
states.103  However, the probability of such an effect is not unimaginable.  
As explained above,104 there is persuasive statistical data that supports 
the argument that “shall-issue” concealed carry laws increase the number 
of gun-related crimes.105  Ian Ayres and John R. Donohue argue that 
there are several potential problems related to “shall-issue” concealed 
carry laws that may contribute to an increase, rather than a decrease, in 
crime rates.106  Ayres and Donohue argue that the adoption of shall-issue 
laws may “increase the speed at which a criminal decides to shoot or 
disable potential victims” because of the risk that any victim could be 
carrying a concealed weapon.107  They also contend that putting more 
guns into circulation is dangerous because of the rate at which weapons 
are stolen in this country.108  These problems may all be exacerbated by 
the broad and ambiguous language of Kansas’s new stand your ground 
law. 
Another problem in Kansas’s stand your ground law that will be 
intensified by concealed carry is the lack of a reasonableness or 
proportionality standard.109  This omission is likely to allow too much 
leeway for people to react with disproportionate force—a serious 
problem when the force being disproportionately used comes from a 
concealed weapon.  Because there is no reasonableness or proportionality 
standard to limit this use of force, it is possible that a person who uses 
deadly force by shooting an attacker could be protected by this statute, 
even if the shooter was not threatened with deadly force by his victim. 
B. Suggested Solutions 
There are two possible avenues available for solving the problems 
likely to arise as a result of the stand your ground law’s ambiguous 
drafting.  First, the legislature should amend the statute to include clear 
                                                     
 102. See Ludwig, supra note 82 (discussing the difficulty involved in gathering conclusive data 
of the use of guns in self-defense). 
 103. Jaffe, supra note 16, at 179. 
 104. See supra Part II.D. 
 105. See generally AYRES & DONOHUE, supra note 80. 
 106. Id. at 1204–06. 
 107. Id. at 1204 (emphasis in original). 
 108. Id. at 1205. 
 109. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3218 (2007). 
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definitions and a reasonableness standard.  In the process, it should 
clarify its intent in enacting the statute.  Alternatively, in interpreting the 
statute, Kansas courts should either clearly define the scope of the terms 
within the statute or interpret a reasonableness standard within the 
meaning of the statute. 
1. Legislative Amendment 
The Kansas Legislature should amend the stand your ground law in 
two ways.  First, the legislature should define the terms in the statute so 
that they can be clearly and unambiguously applied.  Second, the 
legislature should add a reasonableness or proportionality requirement. 
By clearly defining each phrase or term of the statute, the legislature 
will make it easier for courts to apply the statute appropriately to the 
facts of individual cases.  The first term that should be defined is 
“attack.”  The legislature should amend the statute to limit the scope of 
this term to physical attacks.  This change would eliminate the possibility 
that a verbal attack could be met with violent, even deadly, force.  The 
legislature should also define and limit the scope of the phrase “meet 
force with force,” to clarify whether deadly force is permissible under the 
stand your ground law.  Because other statutes specifically allow for the 
use of deadly force when reasonable, with no duty to retreat,110 it may be 
better to limit the stand your ground law to any force other than deadly 
force.  It is widely accepted that a person should be able to use deadly 
force to protect himself from imminent death or great bodily harm.  
However, Kansas’s defense of persons statute already permits such use 
of deadly force, so removing the ability to use deadly force from the 
general stand your ground law would not eliminate people’s ability to 
protect themselves.  The defense of persons statute is not limited by 
location,111 so the right to defend oneself in all places would remain 
intact.  This change would also likely alleviate the bulk of the problems 
associated with concealed carry because the statute would no longer 
protect the use of deadly force.  Indeed, this may have been the 
legislature’s intent in excluding the right to use deadly force from the 
express language of the stand your ground law, but that intent is unclear, 
and so is the statutory language. 
The second amendment to the statute should be a provision requiring 
reasonableness.  This amendment could be done in two ways.  First, the 
                                                     
 110. E.g., id. § 21-3211. 
 111. Id. 
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legislature could add a clause to the end of the statute limiting the 
applicability of the statute to instances where the use of force was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Because Kansas courts interpret 
“reasonable” in the self-defense context to mean both objective and 
subjective reasonableness,112 the same interpretation would likely apply 
to the stand your ground law.  Second, a reasonableness requirement may 
be implicit in the statute if the terms above are clearly defined.  Thus, the 
legislature should define the terms “attack” and “meet force with force.”  
For example, if the statute read “meet force with reasonable or 
proportionate force when physically attacked,” it would be clear that the 
legislature intended to limit the application of the statute to reasonable 
uses of force.  If a person is not physically attacked or if he uses 
disproportionate—or even deadly—force, the statute would not apply. To 
make this change, the legislature could use, as an example, the language 
employed in Kansas’s defense of property other than dwellings statute.113  
This statute allows the use of force to protect property, and it applies a 
reasonableness standard.114  The statute provides that “[o]nly such degree 
of force or threat thereof as a reasonable man would deem necessary to 
prevent or terminate the interference may intentionally be used.”115  
Here, the legislature clearly omitted any reference to the use of deadly 
force which, as stated above, could be a way to limit the stand your 
ground law’s applicability to lesser exercises of force.  Also, there is a 
clear requirement that the force used be in proportion to the threat, which 
could eliminate the possibility of unbalanced retaliation. 
2.  Possible Amendments Based on Other States’ Statutory Language 
Language in other states’ stand your ground laws provide helpful 
examples of how the Kansas Legislature could amend its stand your 
ground law.  Specifically, the Florida, Texas, and Alabama statutes 
provide three models that the Kansas Legislature could use in amending 
its stand your ground law. 
a. Florida 
In Florida, the language of the stand your ground statute is strikingly 
similar to the Kansas statute’s language.  The important difference is that 
                                                     
 112. E.g., State v. Walters, 159 P.3d 174, 180 (Kan. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 113. § 21-3213. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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Florida’s law includes a requirement for reasonableness in the use of 
deadly force.116  The statute provides: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is 
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty 
to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force 
with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is 
necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or 
herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.117 
This statute is a provision of Florida’s larger defense statute.118  
There is still some ambiguity in Florida’s statute—the word “attack” is 
undefined—but it at least provides a good model for how Kansas might 
insert a reasonableness requirement into its stand your ground statute.  
Such insertion is likely the most desirable method of amendment for the 
Kansas statute.  Kansas’s stand your ground law could remain separated 
from the other defense statutes and provide a separate right, but still 
provide the necessary clarification of terms and applicability as amended.  
The Florida Supreme Court has not interpreted the scope of Florida’s 
stand your ground provision, other than to determine that it does not 
apply retroactively.119  So, while the intended application of Florida’s 
statute is somewhat unclear, it is a helpful example for a possible Kansas 
amendment. 
b. Texas 
In 2007, the Texas Legislature amended two of its existing self-
defense statutes to include a presumption of reasonableness in the use of 
force—including deadly force—to defend persons, dwellings, and 
occupied vehicles.120  One of these statutes allows the use of force, but 
not deadly force, and creates a presumption of reasonableness for the 
defender in various enumerated circumstances.121  The other statute 
provides for the use of deadly force, also creating a presumption of 
reasonableness in all of the same circumstances.122  These two statutes do 
                                                     
 116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West 2006). 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. § 776.031. 
 119. State v. Smiley, 966 So.2d 330, 334–35 (Fla. 2007); Thomas v. State, 918 So. 2d 327, 330 
(Fla. 2005). 
 120. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31–9.32 (Vernon 2007). 
 121. Id. § 9.31. 
 122. Id. § 9.32. 
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not include a separate stand your ground provision.123  Rather, the no 
duty to retreat provision is included within the language of the statute 
allowing the use of deadly force in defense of persons.124 
Although the Texas statutes differ in several ways from Kansas’s 
stand your ground law, the Texas statutes provide three useful examples 
of clarifying language that could be used to improve Kansas’s statute.  
First, Texas’s statutes expressly state that the presumption of 
reasonableness the statutes does not apply to force used “in response to 
verbal provocation alone.”125  Second, the use of deadly force is 
specifically confined to one of the two statutes, creating a clear 
delineation for the application of the statutes in cases where there was a 
fatality.126  Finally, the statute allowing the use of deadly force provides a 
list of situations in which a person is presumed reasonable when using 
deadly force.127  The Texas statute provides that a person’s 
belief that the force was immediately necessary . . . is presumed 
reasonable if  the actor: (1) knew or had reason to believe that the 
person against whom force was used . . . (C) was committing or 
attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, 
aggravated sexual assault, robbery or aggravated robbery.128 
The Kansas Legislature could list certain offenses in the definition of 
attack, such as those included in Texas’s statutes, that automatically 
qualify as “attacks” to make the definition even narrower than “physical 
attack.”  This approach could be problematic, though, because someone 
who feels the need to use deadly force to protect himself is not likely to 
stop and think about what offense his attacker may be committing.  
However, narrowing the definition of attack would provide a more 
systematic and predictable framework for the application of the stand 
your ground statute to use-of-force situations.  Kansas courts could look 
at the circumstances of an individual case and know whether or not to 
apply the stand your ground statute to the facts. 
                                                     
 123. Id. § 9.31. 
 124. Id. § 9.32. 
 125. Id. § 9.31(b)(1). 
 126. Id. §§ 9.31–9.32. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 9.31(a)(1)(C). 
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c. Alabama 
Alabama has a separate stand your ground provision, but it relates 
back to the general self-defense provision, which requires reasonableness 
in the use of deadly force.129  The Alabama statute provides: 
A person who is justified under subsection (a) in using physical force, 
including deadly physical force, and who is not engaged in an unlawful 
activity and is in any place where he or she has the right to be has no 
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground.130 
Subsection (a) requires that any force used must be reasonable.131  
The Kansas Legislature could simply add the phrase “as provided for in 
K.S.A. §§ 21-3211 & 21-3212,” and the stand your ground law would be 
governed by the same reasonableness standard as the other defense 
statutes.  This addition would also tie in the explicit right to use deadly 
force, reasonable under the circumstances, that is found in the Kansas 
defense statutes. 
3. Narrow Court Interpretation 
If the Kansas Legislature declines to amend the stand your ground 
law, an alternative solution is for the court either to narrowly define the 
terms currently in the statute or to include a reasonableness requirement. 
If the legislature does not amend the statute to define “attack,” the 
court should interpret the “attack” provision narrowly.  Because “attack” 
can be defined in many ways, the court should limit the definition in the 
stand your ground statute to include only physical attacks.  This is a 
logical interpretation.  The stand your ground law follows the other use 
of force statutes, which allow the use of deadly force to prevent or 
terminate an intrusion, or under the perceived threat of deadly force.  It is 
easily conceivable that the legislature intended for “attack” to refer only 
to physical attacks.  The use of the word “force” suggests an intention to 
limit the meaning of “attack” to physical attacks, because “force” 
suggests a physical, rather than verbal, attack. 
The court should also interpret the “meet force with force” provision 
as including something less than deadly force.  There is already a strong 
                                                     
 129. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2006). 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. § 13A-3-23(a). 
05 - WELLS FINAL 8/24/2008  12:26:20 PM 
2008] HOME ON THE GUN RANGE 999 
argument that the legislature intended to exclude deadly force in enacting 
the statute, because deadly force was expressly mentioned in the statutes 
that included a reasonableness standard.  The court could make an 
analogy to Kansas’s defense of property statute, and could distinguish 
the other two statutes that do allow the use of deadly force.  In instances 
where deadly force is necessary for protection, other defense statutes 
would apply.  As discussed above, this change would reduce or eliminate 
many of the problems in conjunction with the concealed carry statutes.132 
An expansive interpretation of the stand your ground statute allowing 
for the use of deadly force without a reasonableness standard or any 
proportionality would make the defense of persons and defense of 
dwellings statutes meaningless.  In other words, why would the Kansas 
Legislature pass a law whose intended application would totally 
contradict other statutes that it passes simultaneously? 
Alternatively, Kansas courts could interpret the statute to include a 
reasonableness standard.  This interpretation may be difficult because the 
statute’s language does not include any such standard, and the rules of 
statutory construction emphasize that legislative intent is always the most 
important consideration.133  Although not clear, the legislative intent in 
enacting the stand your ground statute may have been to provide a catch-
all statute, clearly stating the rule that a victim of an attack does not have 
to retreat and may stand his or her ground.  It is possible, maybe even 
likely, that the legislature never intended that deadly force would be 
acceptable under this statute.  Deadly force was specifically mentioned in 
the other statutes and not in the stand your ground law.  Legislative 
history does not provide a clear explanation of the Kansas Legislature’s 
intent in enacting the stand your ground law.  There is some indication, 
however, that the legislature only meant to allow the use of deadly force 
in the self-defense and defense of dwelling statutes.  The Supplemental 
Note on Senate Bill No. 366, which is prepared by the Legislative 
Research Department, separately discusses the stand your ground law 
and the amendments to the defense of persons, dwellings, and occupied 
vehicles statutes, by restating the language of the statutes themselves.134  
This Supplemental Note seems to be separating the two statutes 
purposely, as if to indicate that the use of deadly force, specifically 
                                                     
 132. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 133. State ex. rel. Graeber v. Marion County Landfill, Inc., 76 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Kan. 2003) (“‘It 
is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the 
intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.’” (quoting In re Marriage of 
Killman, 955 P.2d 1228 (Kan. 1998))). 
 134. S.B. 366, Supplemental Note, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006). 
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mentioned in the other defense statutes, would only be allowed in those 
statutes that include reasonableness standards.  Unfortunately, the 
Supplemental Note specifically states that it is not intended to reflect 
legislative intent, so the meaning of this separation can only be inferred 
from the structure of the Supplemental Note.135 
Before the original versions of the current self-defense statutes were 
passed, Kansas courts interpreted self-defense to include a required 
element of reasonableness.  The original version also included a 
reasonableness test but did not explicitly allow deadly force.  In both 
State v. Kelly136 and State v. Davis,137 the Kansas Supreme Court held 
that the use of force in self-defense had to be reasonable, even in the 
absence of a statute.  The problem now is that there is a controlling 
statute that includes no mention of reasonableness in the use of force, so 
the court may be hesitant to interpret the statute to mean something the 
statute does not expressly say.  The legislature knew how to include a 
reasonableness requirement and left it out of the stand your ground law.  
The defense statutes were amended at the same time the stand your 
ground law was drafted,138 and it seems unlikely that the legislature 
would add a reasonableness standard to two existing statutes and leave it 
out of a newly drafted one unless it was intentional.  Whether the 
legislature intended to omit a reasonableness requirement is unclear, 
which unfortunately means that it would be difficult for a Kansas court to 
interpret a reasonableness requirement into the statute based on the 
current mandates of statutory construction. 
Because interpreting a reasonableness standard into the statute may 
be difficult based on the statute’s language and the rules of statutory 
construction, the better option may be for courts to expressly define what 
the terms in the statute should mean and how they should be applied.  
This approach poses less of a problem in terms of statutory construction 
because the terms are not defined in any way by the statute, and they 
have to mean something specific.  In other words, because the terms are 
already in the statute, they can be given various meanings.  But without 
any express reasonableness requirement, Kansas courts will not likely 
add one into the language. 
                                                     
 135. Id. 
 136. 291 P. 945 (Kan. 1930). 
 137. 218 P.2d 215 (Kan. 1950). 
 138. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3218 (2006), with §§ 21-3211–12. 
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C. Practical Implications of Suggested Changes 
As between the two proposed remedies, a legislative amendment 
would be the most effective means of clarifying the statute.  An 
amendment would summarily clear up any confusion as to the legislative 
intent in enacting the statute, provided the legislature explained its intent, 
and it would provide important boundaries for a statute that now seems 
unnecessarily inclusive.  If the legislature specifically excluded deadly 
force from the stand your ground statute, it would help alleviate the 
problem associated with the stand your ground law in conjunction with 
concealed carry.  If Kansans carrying guns were not able to use them 
unreasonably while standing their ground in a fight, the likelihood of the 
problems mentioned above would be decreased or eliminated.  Also, a 
statutory amendment would give the Kansas Legislature the opportunity 
to distinguish the purpose of the stand your ground law from the 
purposes of the other amendments to defense statutes. 
A narrow interpretation by the Kansas courts could also provide a 
great deal more direction in the application of the stand your ground law.  
Once the applicability of the statute is clearly determined, the possible 
problems associated with disproportionate retaliations should be 
diminished.  With each new decision from the Kansas courts applying 
the stand your ground law to different factual circumstances, the 
definitions of the statute’s terms would become clearer and the 
uncertainty of the statute’s scope would eventually be eliminated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conjunction with concealed carry, the stand your ground law may 
protect a person who uses unnecessarily harsh or even deadly force 
against an “attacker.”  The precise outcome, however, is unfortunately 
difficult to predict because of the ambiguous nature of the terms of the 
statute.  There are two practical ways to avoid or control this possibility.  
The first is for the Kansas Legislature to amend the statute, and the 
second is for the Kansas courts to interpret the statute narrowly. 
To best control the results generated by Kansas’s stand your ground 
law, the legislature should amend the law to limit its applicability, 
especially in the use of disproportionate deadly force.  The terms 
“attack” and “meet force with force” in the stand your ground law should 
be expressly and narrowly defined, and a requirement of reasonableness 
or proportionality should be added to minimize the possibility for 
disproportionate retaliation.  The legislature also could limit the 
applicability of the statute by expressly disallowing the use of deadly 
05 - WELLS FINAL 8/24/2008  12:26:20 PM 
1002 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
force under the stand your ground law, leaving those situations squarely 
in the purview of Kansas’s other defense laws. 
If the legislature chooses not to amend the statute, it will be up to the 
courts to determine how to shape the meaning of the statute.  To do this, 
the courts should narrowly interpret the terms mentioned above, 
excluding verbal attacks from the definition of “attack” and requiring 
proportional force.  Kansas courts may also attempt to interpret a 
reasonableness standard into the statute, although this would likely prove 
problematic based upon Kansas’s common law rules of statutory 
construction. 
Regardless of the method chosen by the legislature or the courts, the 
stand your ground law cannot effectively be applied or interpreted as 
written without creating unwanted and dangerous results.  Some 
government action is necessary to protect Kansans from each other and 
from themselves. 
 
